Final Paper: The Battle of the Chosin Reservoir

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NS 4333: Fundamentals of Maneuver Warfare

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Oct 28, 2025

Introduction

The Battle of the Chosin Reservoir was one of the most vicious combat actions that the United States Marine Corps engaged in during the 20th century. This combat action pitted the overextended US Army X Corps against a surprise attack by the Chinese 27th Corps. US Forces were quickly surrounded and had to conduct a fighting withdrawal through miles of hostile territory during the coldest winter in decades.

Figure A. Map overview of the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir (Skirbunt, n.d.).

1. Describe the Nature of War in your battle. Be specific – for example describe what was uncertain, friction points, human dimensions, art/science application etc.

The nature of war at the Chosin Reservoir was characterized by chaotic, violent, and heroic actions. Marines faced uncertainty at every step. The massive Chinese intervention was entirely unexpected. Intelligence failures regarding enemy strength and location allowed 12 Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) divisions (120,000-150,000 troops) to mount a surprise attack on the 1st Marine Division (Fehrenbach, 1963). Points of friction during the battle included the freezing weather, the rugged terrain, and overextended supply and logistics. The extreme cold (-35ºF to -50ºF) caused weapons to malfunction, radio batteries to die, and first aid kits and C-rations to freeze (Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency, n.d.). Frostbite eliminated as many Marines as Chinese fire. The mountainous, undeveloped terrain made maneuver difficult. There was only one available road for resupply and withdrawal. Chinese troops controlled the high ground surrounding this road, which made any attempts to support troops costly. This caused the Marine supply lines to fall apart under Chinese pressure. Troops were limited to light aerial resupply by aircraft and helicopters, which often dropped supplies to enemy forces. The human dimension was characterized by Marine Corps esprit de corps, leadership under great pressure, and the Marines' will to survive. Leadership used scientific doctrine as a base for their artistic tactical flexibility. Doctrine did not exist for many situations that the Marines would face, and the success of Marine Forces depended on improvisations from leaders at every level, from squad to division. Elements of chance involved the snowy, inclement weather grounding air operations and the timing of the Chinese offensive. The campaign was especially violent, characterized by brutal close combat, massive casualties on both sides, and a life-or-death encirclement.

2. Describe how the Theory of War applied to your battle. Questions to consider:

a. What role did your battle play to enforce policy?

The Battle of the Chosin Reservoir supported UN/US policy to resist communist aggression in Korea and in greater Asia as a whole. The overarching policy at play here was President Truman's Domino Theory, which emphasized the prevention of Communist growth in Asia at all costs to maintain the current status quo in the region (Korean War Legacy Foundation, n.d.).

b. What level(s) of war did it affect?

This battle affected all three levels of war. At the tactical level, US Marine forces broke out of the Chinese encirclement and captured key terrain features at Fox Hill and Toktong Pass (Drury & Clavin, 2009). At the operational level, the US X Corps was able to evacuate all of its forces from the port of Hungnam. At the strategic level, the collapse of UN forces was prevented, and they were able to be repositioned to stop the Chinese advance south of the 38th parallel.

c. What were the friendly and enemy Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities?

The USMC had centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities at all levels of war during the battle. At the tactical level, the USMC's centers of gravity were the bulk of the 1st Marine Division located at Yudam-ni and the airfield located in Hagaru-ri, supported by 3rd Battalion 1st Marines. The USMC's critical vulnerabilities were the stretched and weakened supply lines along the MSR and the lone outpost on Fox Hill protecting the Toktong Pass (U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2022). The Chinese centers of gravity were the 58th, 59th, 79th, 80th, and 89th

divisions placed in ambush positions to destroy the 1st Marine Division. Specifically, the biggest Chinese center of gravity was their complete control of the MSR throughout the entire reservoir, except for Fox Hill and the Toktong Pass. The Chinese critical vulnerabilities were their overextended supply lines stretching in from the Chinese border and their lack of control over the wilderness territory that stretched beyond the MSR.

d. How were CGs and CVs exploited?

The Chinese exploited the USMC centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities by surrounding and laying siege to the USMC strongholds at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri, and Fox Hill. These actions cut off over 30,000 Marines behind enemy lines and destroyed their logistics support. The Chinese dedicated multiple regiments to destroy the US outpost at Fox Hill and almost succeeded. If this exploitation had worked, the 1st Marine Division would have been cut off and completely destroyed unless they completed a suicidal breakout through 15 miles of enemy territory. The USMC exploited the Chinese centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities by bypassing the MSR with their forces and flanking the Chinese formations along the MSR and besieging Fox Hill. The legendary story of the Ridge Runners, who executed a 14-mile combat march under fire overnight to relieve Fox Company, is the result of this exploitation. The destruction of the Chinese regiments at Fox Hill opened Toktong Pass fully to the 1st Marine Division to break out from Yudam-ni and the Chosin Reservoir and push toward the airfield and stronghold at Hagaru-ri.

3. How did the USMC prepare for the conflict? Questions to consider:

a. Was the enemy prepared?

The Chinese Forces were completely prepared for the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir. The entire Chinese 9th Army Group was able to be secretly inserted into the reservoir without the knowledge of the US High Command. On top of this, the Chinese scouted US positions, planned ambush routes along the MSR, positioned forces throughout the mountains, and waited until inclement weather grounded US air support to begin the attack. The ambush caught the entire 1st Marine Division off guard and allowed the Chinese to inflict devastating initial losses against US Forces (Appleman, 1989).

b. Describe Equipment, Training, Organization, etc.

The Chinese infantryman was a tough, combat-hardened veteran. Many of these soldiers had been in continuous combat for years, stretching from the Chinese Civil War through World War Two and into Korea. The standard soldier was a poor, likely illiterate, peasant who had a harsh upbringing. However, this upbringing allowed them to withstand hardships unthinkable for US Forces. Some soldiers had participated in campaigns that had them marching and fighting for 20 miles a day for over 1,000 miles. Roughly 70% of the Chinese forces present in Chosin were combat veterans. Regardless, these troops were poorly equipped, and many had limited supplies of ammunition. The standard-issue Chinese weapon was an old bolt-action rifle or a short-range submachine gun. These weapons were not up to par with the US semi-automatic battle rifles, carbines, and M1/M3 submachine guns. Many soldiers were ordered to scavenge weapons and ammunition from dead comrades and enemies. Grenades, however, were a common issue item that allowed Chinese Assault Troops to overrun US positions with greater ease. The Chinese

Forces were organized similarly to western forces in Divisional, Regimental, Battalion, and Company structures. US Forces were equipped with battle rifles, submachine guns, grenades, squad automatic weapons, and light machine guns. Many Marines were green due to the lack of Chinese/North Korean contact that the X Corps had encountered to this point. The US Forces were organized as a Corps with the 1st Marine Division on the western side of the reservoir and the US Army's 31st Regimental Combat Team on the eastern side of the reservoir. US and Chinese forces alike encountered massive issues with the extreme cold. Both sides' weapons and equipment failed in the snow, and they experienced numerous casualties due to the cold and inadequate cold weather gear.

4. Describe how the USMC conducted (or did not conduct) Maneuver Warfare. Questions to consider:

a. How did they shape actions?

The USMC shaped the battlefield by securing key terrain and creating conditions for decisive action. Fox Company held Toktong Pass for five days, preventing the Chinese from cutting the MSR. General Smith's foresight in pre-positioning supply dumps at Hagaru-ri and constructing an airstrip under fire created a strong point for consolidation. The perimeter defense at Yudam-ni allowed for consolidation of scattered units and prepared for a coordinated breakout versus a piecemeal retreat.

b. Was there commander's intent (CI)?

General O.P. Smith's commander's intent was clear and consistent throughout the battle: preserve the division as a fighting force and maintain offensive spirit despite withdrawal. His famous statement, "Retreat, hell! We're not retreating, we're just advancing in a different direction," embodied this intent. The intent included maintaining unit cohesion, bringing out equipment and casualties, and continuing to inflict casualties on the enemy.

c. If so, how was CI accomplished?

Commander's intent was accomplished through decentralized execution and mission-type orders. Battalion and company commanders made tactical decisions and adapted to local situations. For example, Captain Barber at Fox Company made decisions on the defense of Toktong Pass without higher guidance for days. Units stayed together even in chaos, wounded and dead were evacuated, and equipment was brought out when possible. Even in withdrawal, Marines attacked through roadblocks rather than evading them, maintaining an offensive mindset.

d. What important decisions were made?

Several critical decisions shaped the battle's outcome. General Smith's pre-battle decisions to slow the advance despite orders, stockpile supplies at Hagaru-ri, and build an airstrip against higher orders saved the division. The decision to consolidate forces rather than withdraw piecemeal maintained combat power. LtCol Raymond Davis's decision to lead a relief column through Chinese lines at night to relieve Fox Company was bold and decisive. The decision to

air-drop bridge sections at Funchilin Pass enabled the division's escape when the Chinese had destroyed the bridge.

e. How were combined arms utilized (or not)?

Combined arms were utilized extensively throughout the battle. Infantry and artillery worked in concert, with the 11th Marines (artillery) providing continuous fire support along the MSR. Close air support by Marine Corsairs, when weather permitted, devastated Chinese forces with napalm and strafing runs. Infantry-tank teams broke through multiple Chinese roadblocks along the withdrawal route. Engineers were critical at Funchilin Pass, where they installed air-dropped bridge sections under fire, enabling the division's escape. All arms worked together, with infantry protecting artillery, artillery enabling infantry movement, engineers enabling everyone to escape, and aviation multiplying the effects of all ground elements. This integration created dilemmas the Chinese could not solve.

5. How were orders issued (written, spoken, messenger, etc)? Questions to consider:

a. Were initial orders sufficient?

Initial orders were not sufficient due to intelligence failures. The orders assumed minor Chinese presence when the Marines were actually facing 120,000+ Chinese troops. The original mission to advance to the Yalu River became irrelevant when the Chinese attacked. Orders did not account for winter warfare conditions, and the timeline was unrealistic given terrain and weather. General Almond told Marines the Chinese wouldn't attack in such weather, which proved catastrophically wrong.

b. Was the METT-TC analysis accurate?

The METT-TC analysis was deeply flawed, particularly regarding the enemy. The mission changed from offensive to survival and withdrawal. The enemy assessment was completely inaccurate—planners underestimated enemy strength by a factor of ten and didn't anticipate Chinese offensive intent. Terrain and weather assessments were partially accurate; planners knew it would be difficult but underestimated the severity of -30°F to -40°F temperatures and their effects on equipment and personnel. The assessment of troops available didn't account for cold weather degradation of combat effectiveness. Time available was inaccurate, with the timeline too optimistic. Civilian considerations were not adequately addressed in initial planning, as 98,000+ Korean refugees eventually followed Marines south, complicating the withdrawal.

c. Did the original plan change or get modified?

The original plan changed dramatically multiple times. Initially, the plan was to advance to the Yalu River. After the Chinese attack on 27-28 November, orders shifted from offensive to defensive operations. On 28-29 November, the plan changed again to consolidate forces and pull units back to Hagaru-ri and Yudam-ni. From 29 November to 1 December, orders focused on holding perimeters and preparing for breakout. On 1-3 December, the mission became "attack to the south" and break through the Chinese encirclement. The plan continued to evolve through multiple phases, culminating in the critical Funchilin Pass bridge operation (8-9 December), which required major improvisation when the bridge was destroyed. The final phase (10-11 December) shifted from a land campaign to an amphibious withdrawal at Hungnam.

d. If possible, provide an image of the operational plan, landing plan, etc. to aid your description.



Figure B. Map of tactical retreat from the Chosin Reservoir (Armchair General, n.d.).

6. Describe how the USMC achieved success (or failed). Questions to consider:

a. Was it a tactical victory but strategic failure?

The Battle of the Chosin Reservoir was a tactical victory, an operational success within a larger setback, and strategic damage control. At the tactical level, it was a clear victory. Marines inflicted a 10:1 casualty ratio on Chinese forces (approximately 900 Marine KIA and 3,500 WIA versus 25,000-40,000 Chinese casualties). The division withdrew as an organized unit, maintained command structure, and preserved fighting capability. The Chinese 9th Army Group was rendered combat ineffective and took months to reconstitute. At the operational level, the situation was more complicated. While the X Corps mission to advance to the Yalu River failed and all ground gained was lost, the 1st Marine Division's success enabled the evacuation of the entire X Corps (105,000 troops) and prevented the encirclement and destruction of a major UN force. At the strategic level, the battle prevented disaster. While the overall strategic goal to reunify Korea failed, the Marine action prevented strategic defeat, maintained credibility of US commitment, and enabled the eventual establishment of an armistice at the 38th parallel.

b. How was command and control utilized to accomplish the mission and finish the enemy?

Command and control was critical to success at Chosin. The Marines employed decentralized execution with clear commander's intent. When radio communications failed in the extreme cold and units were separated by 13+ miles, subordinate commanders exercised initiative based on their understanding of General Smith's intent. Leadership at all levels was essential. General Smith's preparation phase decisions, his visits to units when possible, and his protection of the division from X Corps interference were crucial. Regimental commanders like Colonels Litzenberg, Murray, and Puller coordinated operations and maintained aggressive

leadership. Company and platoon leaders like Captain Barber at Fox Company stepped up when isolated or when casualties occurred among senior leaders.

The organizational structure of the Marine Corps enabled effective C2. Integrated combined arms reduced coordination complexity, small unit cohesion built trust that enabled decentralized execution, and the experienced NCO corps maintained continuity when officers became casualties. When technology failed, Marines adapted by using physical messengers, face-to-face coordination, visual signals, and aircraft to drop messages. This redundancy in C2 systems prevented total breakdown.

Specific C2 decisions enabled success throughout the battle. The decision to consolidate forces (28-29 November) created defensible positions versus being picked off piecemeal. The order for Fox Company to hold Toktong Pass "at all costs" kept the MSR open for breakout. The Davis relief column mission (2 December) saved Fox Company and reopened the MSR. The breakout order from Yudam-ni (1 December) concentrated combat power. The decision to build and defend the airstrip enabled evacuation of 4,500 casualties and resupply. The Funchilin Pass bridge operation coordinated Air Force air drop, engineers to install the bridge, and infantry to secure the site—a true combined arms success.

C2 enabled "finishing the enemy" through coordinated fires. The 11th Marines (artillery) coordinated fires division-wide, forward air controllers directed close air support, and infantry reported targets and called in fires. This created devastating effects on Chinese forces. Combined arms integration synchronized infantry, armor, artillery, and air, creating kill zones at roadblocks. The breakout from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri exemplifies this—infantry attacked roadblocks, artillery suppressed Chinese on high ground, air struck concentrations, tanks supported infantry,

and engineers cleared obstacles. C2 coordinated all elements, resulting in 1,500+ Chinese killed in the 14-mile movement.

7. Describe the types of offensive and defensive operations utilized in your battle. Questions to consider:

a. Should different tactics have been used?

The tactics employed were largely appropriate given the situation. The aggressive, offensive-minded defense maintained initiative, and the fighting withdrawal preserved combat power better than a panicked retreat. Maintaining unit cohesion prevented destruction, and destroying Chinese forces rather than evading them prevented effective pursuit. Bringing out combat power meant the division remained effective, and Marine Corps values required bringing out casualties for morale. Pre-battle, the division should not have been dispersed so widely (General Smith argued against this), better cold weather preparation was needed, and better intelligence would have prevented the situation entirely. However, given the situation once encircled, the tactics employed were optimal.

b. Was maneuver warfare utilized?

Yes, maneuver warfare was utilized despite the overall defensive nature of the battle. Marines maintained operational tempo and didn't let the Chinese dictate the pace. Even in withdrawal, Marines had the initiative and chose when and where to fight, with the Chinese reacting to Marine movements. Marines attacked gaps in Chinese positions, conducted night operations when Chinese expected defense, and used combined arms to exploit Chinese lack of

firepower and air power. The "surfaces and gaps" concept was applied by avoiding Chinese strength (masses of infantry) and hitting weak points (logistics, command and control, lack of heavy weapons). Mission tactics allowed for decentralized execution throughout, with subordinates exercising initiative guided by commander's intent. Examples of maneuver warfare include the Davis relief column's bold maneuver versus a cautious approach, breakout operations that attacked through obstacles rather than sneaking around them, and continuous movement that didn't allow the Chinese to fix Marines in place.

c. Describe how logistics facilitated or hindered the offensive/defensive operations.

Logistics both hindered and facilitated operations. The single Main Supply Route (MSR) was highly vulnerable, and the Chinese cut it in multiple places with roadblocks. The distance from ports (78 miles from Hungnam to Yudam-ni), mountainous terrain that limited vehicle mobility, and winter weather complicated everything. The cold weather caused equipment failures—weapons froze, vehicles wouldn't start, medical supplies froze (plasma, blood, morphine), fuel consumption was massive as vehicles ran 24/7 to prevent freezing, food froze solid, and battery failures affected radios and vehicles. Frostbite casualties exceeded combat casualties initially, and medical evacuation was challenging.

However, logistics solutions facilitated success. General Smith's foresight in pre-positioning supply dumps at Hagaru-ri before the battle started, stockpiling ammunition, fuel, and food, saved the division. The Hagaru-ri airstrip, built under fire during the battle, enabled air resupply when ground routes were cut. C-47 transports landed with supplies and left with wounded, evacuating 4,500+ casualties and bringing in critical supplies. Air resupply included parachute drops to surrounded units and the famous air drop of bridge sections at

Funchilin Pass. Engineers cleared roadblocks, maintained the MSR, built and repaired bridges, and were critical at Funchilin Pass where they installed air-dropped bridge sections. The logistics organization included supply dumps at each perimeter, centralized distribution, prioritization systems for limited supplies, and a medical evacuation system that gave air priority to the most serious casualties.

Logistics impacted offensive and defensive operations by enabling adequate ammunition for intense combat, providing fuel for vehicle and tank employment, maintaining morale through medical care, and breaking the Chinese encirclement's effectiveness through air supply. However, logistics also constrained operations—Marines had to fight for the MSR rather than bypass it, limited maneuver occurred due to supply line vulnerability, withdrawal speed was limited by the logistics tail, and casualties slowed movement. The balance struck by Marines was to choose deliberate operations over speed, bring out equipment to maintain combat capability, and let logistics considerations shape tactics (fight for the MSR versus abandon it).

d. If able, include an image of the attack/defense.



Figure C. Tactical view of evacuation from Hungnam (Japanese Student Volunteer Army Comrades Association, n.d.).

8. Describe how your battle supported joint operations. Questions to consider:

a. Were they expeditionary operations or amphibious operations?

The Battle of the Chosin Reservoir was both expeditionary and amphibious in nature. It was primarily an expeditionary operation—a land campaign in North Korea far from U.S. support bases, with Marines operating 78+ miles inland from the coast in a self-sustaining manner. However, it had amphibious bookends. The campaign followed the amphibious assault at Inchon (September 1950), which led to the advance north into North Korea. The battle concluded with an amphibious withdrawal at Hungnam (December 1950), where 105,000 UN troops, 98,000+ Korean refugees, 350,000 tons of cargo, and 17,500 vehicles were evacuated by sea under potential enemy fire, with Navy ships providing fire support during the evacuation.

b. What support/coordination took place with other nations or military branches?

The 1st Marine Division was a major component of the US Army X Corps and operated alongside the Army 7th Infantry Division and Army 3rd Infantry Division. The Marines protected the western flank of the reservoir while the Army protected the eastern flank. These actions allowed for X Corps to successfully fight its way out of the Chosin Reservoir. The Navy also played a significant supporting role in the amphibious withdrawal at Hungnam. Naval gunfire, naval aviation elements, landing ships, and logistical elements supported and enabled the withdrawal of the entire X Corps along with its supporting equipment and civilian refugees. The Air Force played perhaps the most significant role of other branches, as their air strikes and aerial resupply missions kept the Chinese at bay. Small elements of British Royal Marines and Republic of Korea Forces were integrated into X Corps as well and contributed to the battle.

c. If historically possible, what effects did aviation have on your battle?

The impact of aviation support on the outcome of the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir cannot be overstated. Marine Corps Aviation Elements conducted danger-close fire missions throughout the battle once weather permitted. Napalm, rocket, and bomb strikes bolstered the combat power of the Marines and allowed them to repel massive formations of Chinese Forces. Additionally, the air supply drops kept Marine units from being overrun. The most influential aviation aspect of this battle, however, has to be the mass delivery of supplies and evacuation of wounded from Hagaru-ri. This allowed the wounded X Corps to send its casualties back to the rear and resupply for the 70-mile push to the sea. Without the aviation elements present in this battle, the future of X Corps, the 1st Marine Division, and the outcome of the entire war would have been at stake.

9. Describe the enemy the USMC was fighting. Questions to consider:

a. Were they near peer threats, conventional fighters, guerrilla fighters? What tactics did the enemy use? Did the USMC use maneuver warfare to compete with them – how so? Did the USMC change the way it fought against this enemy?

The USMC was fighting a near-peer conventional force. The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) 9th Army Group was composed of 12 divisions totaling over 120,000 troops. They were a well-trained, disciplined military force with an organized command structure and combat experience. The Chinese forces relied on mass infantry tactics with limited artillery, machine guns, and mortars. They had no air support in any capacity and lacked advanced logistics. In

order to counter US air superiority, Chinese Forces relied mainly on night attacks. They preferred infiltration and encirclement tactics over full frontal assaults. The sheer number of Chinese troops gave them massive combat effectiveness; however, troops relied mainly on small arms.

The USMC utilized maneuver warfare in all aspects to counter the Chinese assault. Close air support was used to repel daytime Chinese assaults, tanks and artillery were used to smash Chinese positions and formations, and Chinese command and control signals (bugles and whistles) were disrupted with mortar and artillery fire. The Marines shifted many tactics in order to better counter the Chinese assaults. Nighttime defensive positions were reinforced to a significant degree, fire support vectors were pre-calculated and marked, and resupply was conducted via air. These factors all contributed to the destruction of Chinese pursuit forces in the Chosin Reservoir.

b. How different would the battle have been with today's technology and training?

With today's technology and training, the battle would have been a completely different engagement. Modern technology and training have significantly increased the combat effectiveness of the USMC and the US Military as a whole (Pietrucha, 2020). Assuming that the US Forces in their historical composition still brought the Chinese 9th Army Group to battle, X Corps would have annihilated the Chinese Forces. The innumerable technological improvements include advanced reconnaissance, logistical, and combat elements. Satellite imaging and thermal drones would have illuminated the Chinese positions before contact was ever made. Cruise missiles, guided bombs, and other advanced strike capabilities would decimate assaulting forces before they could engage US Forces. If contact was made, standard-issue body armor, automatic rifles, modern machine guns, and advanced mortars would wreak havoc. Modern M1 Abrams

Tanks would have been significantly better than the USMC's dated M26 Pershing tanks. Finally, the modern logistics of the US Military would have allowed X Corps to remain supplied indefinitely. Modernized cold weather gear, medical equipment, and heating gear would massively reduce the number of weather-related casualties as well. To summarize: it would be similar to the US performance during Operation Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom (U.S. Air Force, n.d.).

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